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SHIFTING THE BURDEN: POTENTIAL 
APPLICABILITY OF BUSH V. GORE TO 
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY  
SITING 
Alison E. Hickey*
Abstract: Since its inception in the 1980s, advocates of the environmental 
justice movement have attempted to remedy the disproportionate siting 
of hazardous waste facilities in minority neighborhoods by employing the 
Equal Protection Clause. These lawsuits have thus far been largely unsuc-
cessful because of litigants’ inability to prove intentional discrimination 
by government actors in such siting decisions. However, in the 2000 deci-
sion issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, the mere potential 
for discriminate impact of a decision made by government actors was suf-
ªcient to trigger a strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause. While the decision was declared to have little precedential value 
outside the voting rights context, this Note examines the potential for 
application of this novel approach to the Equal Protection Clause in fu-
ture environmental justice claims arising under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Introduction 
 On the morning of December 12, 2000, Americans waited in an-
ticipation for the U.S. Supreme Court to issue its opinion in Bush v. 
Gore.1 Under immense time pressure, the Court issued a controversial 
opinion speciªcally delineated as having no precedential value beyond 
the boundaries of the case.2 The ruling, which redeªned long-held 
precedent regarding the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause to the U.S. Constitution, upheld the election 
of George W. Bush as the President of the United States.3
                                                                                                                      
* Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2005–
06. 
1 See generally Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 253–77 (E.J. 
Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001) [hereinafter Cases and Commentary] (compiling 
editorials and commentary written from the days leading up to the decision). 
2 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
3 See id. at 145–46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ªnding that “since time was, and is, too short 
to permit the lower courts to iron out signiªcant differences through ordinary judicial 
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 Many constitutional scholars contend that it would be naive to 
expect the Supreme Court to begin applying this method of equal 
protection analysis—whereby proof of potentially discriminate impact 
of government actions is sufªcient to trigger strict scrutiny—to future 
litigation arising under the Equal Protection Clause, because the Court 
has steadfastly applied a different standard for nearly twenty years.4 
However, the Court’s willingness to depart from its own well-
established standards in Bush created new hope for plaintiffs who have 
been unable to prevail on equal protection claims because of an in-
ability to prove the intentional discrimination necessary to trigger strict 
scrutiny.5
 The dilemma of proving intentional discrimination has been a ma-
jor roadblock to the environmental justice (EJ) movement,6 which was 
brought to national attention as the result of vocal opposition to haz-
ardous waste facility siting in minority neighborhoods in the early 
1980s.7 The movement, however, could face renewed hope if EJ propo-
nents can successfully use the Bush brand of Equal Protection analysis as 
a viable argument for burden shifting. Although many scholars and 
constitutional advocates believe that the Bush opinion was motivated 
more by politics than by the Constitution,8 the constitutional system 
trusts the Supreme Court Justices to put aside their individual political 
                                                                                                                      
review . . . I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness 
should have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem”); 
Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Crash Landing: No One Said It Would Be Pretty, Nat’l Rev. 
Online, Dec. 13, 2000, reprinted in Cases and Commentary, supra note 1, at 284. 
4 See, e.g., Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on Its Head, Perhaps 
for a Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 435, 479–80 (2002). 
5 See Eric Foner, Partisanship Rules, The Nation, Jan. 1, 2001, at 6–7, in Cases and 
Commentary, supra note 1, at 293 (“[B]y extending the issue of equal protection to the 
casting and counting of votes, the Court has opened the door to challenging our highly 
inequitable system of voting. . . . But Bush v. Gore may galvanize demands for genuine 
equality of participation in the democratic process that legislatures and a future Court may 
view sympathetically.”). 
6 See Carolyn M. Mitchell, Environmental Racism: Race as a Primary Factor in the Selection of 
Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 Nat’l Black L.J. 176, 183 (1993) (asserting that the “burden [of 
proving intent] is difªcult because plaintiffs often have the least access to evidence of ra-
cial bias”); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 394, 
410 (1991) (ªnding that “[t]he establishment of intent as the sine qua non of racial dis-
crimination has created a quite onerous burden of proof for plaintiffs”). 
7 See Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental 
Quality 29 (3d ed. 2000); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between 
Environmental Laws and “Justice,” 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 221, 226 (1997). 
8 See Foner, supra note 5, at 293 (asserting that “[t]he Court, to be sure, has always 
been political, but rarely as blatantly as today”). 
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beliefs for the sake of constitutional uniformity.9 Thus, the reasoning of 
the Bush decision, though claimed to have no precedential value, can-
not be held meaningless.10 Rather, the reasoning could affect future 
equal protection litigation for EJ advocates.11
 This Note focuses on the difªculty EJ advocates face when litigating 
racial discrimination claims related to the siting of hazardous waste fa-
cilities. Objective data illustrating the discriminatory impact of govern-
ment actions supports the racially discriminatory effect of siting deci-
sions.12 Nevertheless, courts have continuously refused to apply a strict 
scrutiny analysis to siting decisions.13 If the equal protection analysis of 
Bush becomes precedent for future racial discrimination cases, its appli-
cation to EJ litigation would mirror that used by lower courts in other 
areas of the law over the past thirty years. Part I of this Note examines 
the history and evolution of the modern EJ Movement. Part II discusses 
the barrier EJ plaintiffs face in proving intentional discrimination by 
government actors in hazardous waste facility siting decisions. Part III 
examines the Bush decision in depth and draws an analytical link be-
tween Bush and the EJ movement. The conclusion argues that while 
Bush has yet to be directly applied outside of the voting rights context— 
and even has limited applicability within voting rights—its holding 
leaves room for a novel approach to EJ litigation and renews hope for 
the burden shifting potential of equal protection for EJ litigants. 
                                                                                                                      
9 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (enabling the Court to decide only issues which “aris[e] 
under this Constitution”) 
10 See Lapointe, supra note 4, at 480–81. 
11 See id. 
12 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting of Hazardous 
Waste Landªlls and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Sur-
rounding Communities app. 1 (1983) [hereinafter GAO Report]; Commission for Ra-
cial Justice, (United Church of Christ), Toxic Wastes and Race in the United 
States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of 
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, at xi–xv, 13 (1987), reprinted in Kenneth A. 
Manaster, Environmental Protection and Justice 167–70 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
UCCRJ Study]. 
13 See, e.g., E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zon-
ing Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 888 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1989); 
Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 679–80 (S.D. Tex. 1979). For a discussion 
of the holdings of these cases, and data presented, see infra Part III.C. 
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I. The Environmental Justice Movement 
A. Warren County, North Carolina 
 In 1978, more than 30,000 gallons of oil laced with polychlori-
nated biphenyl (PCB), a toxin, were covertly dumped along a 210-mile 
stretch of North Carolina’s roadways, contaminating the roadside 
soil.14 Four years later, North Carolina Governor James B. Hunt made 
an executive decision to construct a PCB landªll in Warren County to 
bury the nearly 32,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil.15 Warren 
County is one of the poorest counties of North Carolina, comprised of 
an eighty-four percent minority population.16 Civil Rights activists, po-
litical leaders, and local residents came together to protest the con-
struction of the proposed PCB landªll, bringing national attention to 
the race- and class-based inequities of hazardous waste facility siting, 
and launching the modern EJ movement.17 More than ªve hundred 
protesters were arrested, but their efforts were not futile.18 The pro-
tests prompted Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy—an active partici-
pant in the protests—to initiate a study of hazardous waste facility sit-
ing in the South by the U.S. General Accounting Ofªce (GAO).19 The 
study, along with its successors, have objectively demonstrated that an 
overwhelming percentage of hazardous waste facilities have been, and 
continue to be, sited in minority and low-income communities.20 While 
the ªndings of such studies have yet to compel judicial remediation, 
recent developments in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence may 
provide new hope.21
                                                                                                                      
14 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 30. Subsequently, the owners were sent to jail for crimi-
nal dumping, but the problem of the contaminated soil persisted. See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id.; Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in Race 
and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse 82, 90 (Bunyan 
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter Race and the Incidence]; Jill E. Evans, 
Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redeªning the Concept of Intent, 40 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 1219, 1246 (1998). 
17 See Bullard, supra note 16, at 90; Valerie P. Mahoney, Note, Environmental Justice: From 
Partial Victories to Complete Solutions, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 361, 363–64 (1999). 
18 Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices 
from the Grassroots 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993). 
19 See Bullard, supra note 16, at 91. 
20 For a discussion of the studies and their ªndings, see infra Part II.C. 
21 See generally GAO Report, supra note 12. 
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B. The Evolution of Environmental Justice 
 Throughout American history, the natural environment has been 
a source of national pride in poetry, journalism, and political ideals.22 
Such representations of a pristine environment may reºect the reality 
of afºuent landowners, but they turn a blind eye to the environmental 
hazards and poor public health conditions in disadvantaged commu-
nities.23 Minority and low-income Americans have continually suffered 
the burdens of the environment’s shortcomings, such as the toxic 
waste facility proposed in Warren County.24 Toxic dumping and haz-
ardous waste facilities are a result of industrial development through-
out the country,25 and while these burdens of development ought to 
be spread across all communities, facility siting decisions have followed 
the “path of least resistance,” resulting in disproportionate siting in mi-
nority and low-income communities.26
 Over the past thirty years, national attention has been brought to 
the distributive and political justice—or injustice—involved in envi-
ronmental decisionmaking.27 Advocates for the EJ movement argue 
“for an equitable distribution of the costs and beneªts of maintaining a 
suitable environment in which to live.”28 When a decision harms a mi-
nority group that is not represented in the decisionmaking process, po-
litical justice is compromised.29 Some scholars hypothesize that un-
wanted land uses, such as hazardous waste facilities, are concentrated in 
poor communities rather than afºuent suburbs because wealthier 
neighborhoods are able to leverage the political and economic power 
                                                                                                                      
22 See William A. Shutkin, The Concept of Environmental Justice and a Reconception of Democ-
racy, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 579, 580–82 (1995). Shutkin points to Thomas Jefferson’s belief 
that the fertile lands of America would be the birthplace of the nation’s democratic iden-
tity, historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier hypothesis,” poet Walt Whitman’s con-
ception of America as a “new social order founded upon nature,” and urban planner Fre-
derick Law Olmsted’s design of urban parks to “lessen the divisions caused by industrial, 
urban society and provide occasional relief from its rampant social strife” to make this 
point. Id. 
23 See id. at 583–84. 
24 See Kaswan, supra note 7, at 230. 
25 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 3; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: 
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 807–08 (1993). 
26 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 3; Lazarus, supra note 25, at 807–08. 
27 See Kaswan, supra note 7, at 231–38 (discussing EJ in both its distributive and political 
capacities). 
28 See Mihaela Popescu & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Whose Environmental Justice? Social Identity 
and Institutional Rationality, 19 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 141, 146 (2004). 
29 See Kaswan, supra note 7, at 233–38 (deªning political justice as the equal represen-
tation of all citizens’ interests in the decisionmaking process at the local, state, and federal 
level). 
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necessary to prevent unwanted land uses in their communities, while 
poor communities are comparatively powerless.30 Public opposition is 
much stronger in afºuent neighborhoods than in low-income 
neighborhoods, because residents of afºuent communities are more 
likely to be members of local government, are more aware of the deci-
sions affecting them, and are better able to organize resistance to lo-
cally unwanted land uses.31 However, public opposition should not be a 
consideration in the decisionmaking process.32
 Nevertheless, government and industry choose to site facilities in 
locations where they will meet the least amount of resistance; conse-
quently, they target lower-income, minority communities.33 Not only 
are these communities poor, with little political leverage, but they are 
frequently located near industry and transportation routes, which are 
attractive characteristics for toxic waste facility owners.34 The result 
has been a disproportionate concentration of such facilities in pre-
dominantly minority communities.35 The EJ movement emerged from 
the desire of constitutional rights advocates and environmentalists to 
remedy this inequity and ensure that environmental burdens are dis-
persed equally, with a blind eye to issues of race and income.36 Injus-
tices in environmental decisionmaking in this country are not new— 
when European settlers arrived in America over ªve hundred years 
ago, they displaced Native Americans, conªscated their land and rede-
ªned land use relationships.37 The fact that EJ concerns are not new, 
however, does not mean that they are not redressable.38
                                                                                                                      
30 See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots 
Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 69, 70–71 (1991); 
Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in Race and 
the Incidence, supra note 16, at 163, 163–64, 169.
31 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 30, at 163–64; Austin & Schill, supra note 30, at 70–71.
32 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 30, at 163–64; Austin & Schill, supra note 30, at 70–71.
33 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 30, at 163–64. 
34 See Evans, supra note 16, at 1228. See generally Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with 
It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 
1001, 1015–27 (1993) (discussing the cause of disproportionate siting, including immobil-
ity of poorer residents and inexpensive land values). 
35 See Evans, supra note 16, at 1228. See generally Been, supra note 34, at 1015–27. 
36 See Been, supra note 34, at 1005. 
37 See Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Im-
pact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 
211, 221 (1994). 
38 For a discussion of lawsuits brought to remedy this situation, see infra Part III. 
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C. Civil Rights as the Foundation for Environmental Justice 
 According to Robert Bullard, the inequitable distribution of envi-
ronmental burdens in certain communities cannot be explained by 
class alone, but is a product of “[r]acial barriers to education, employ-
ment, and housing [which] reduce mobility options available to the 
black underclass and the black middle class.”39 While racism has been 
prohibited by law, racist attitudes—both conscious and subconscious— 
persist.40 These attitudes have contributed to a nonuniform, noncolor-
blind distribution of hazardous waste facilities.41 As one author states, 
“the evidence so compellingly suggests that the people who most often 
bear the dangers of living near the excreta of our acquisitive industrial 
society are the very same ones who have been most abused throughout 
our history.”42 Racial minorities have been the persistent victims of dis-
crimination in America and today possess signiªcantly less power in so-
ciety, the marketplace, and the political sphere.43
 While environmental inequities cannot be reduced to either eco-
nomic or racial factors, subconscious racial biases have been shown 
through numerous studies to be linked to the perpetuation of un-
equal environmental quality between white communities and com-
munities of color.44 The protests in Warren County brought national 
attention to the plight of minority communities, and numerous pro-
tests, demonstrations, pickets, boycotts, and petition drives have fol-
lowed during the past twenty-ªve years.45 This opposition has incorpo-
rated strategies used by the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s to bring attention to the subversive racism underlying siting de-
cisions.46 The protests evolved from the efforts of the same institu-
tions, organizations, leaders and networks, which facilitated the Civil 
                                                                                                                      
39 Bullard, supra note 7, at 6. 
40 Lazarus, supra note 25, at 807. 
41 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 99–101; Lazarus, supra note 25, at 807–08. 
42 Colin Crawford, Uproar at Dancing Rabbit Creek: Battling over Race, Class 
and the Environment 367 (1996). 
43 See Lazarus, supra note 25, at 806–12; Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ 
Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing 
Equal Protection Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 937, 945–46 (1993). 
44 See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to Confronting Environmental Racism, supra 
note 18, at 11. 
45 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 8; Evans, supra note 16, at 1245, 1247. 
46 See Kaswan, supra note 7, at 235; Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Mean-
ing of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & Com. 597, 601 (1996). 
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Rights movement.47 As a result, the EJ movement has provided the 
basis for one of the “fastest growing areas of legal scholarship”: envi-
ronmental racism.48 This concept includes “any policy, practice, or 
directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended 
or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race or 
color.”49 The term was coined during the Warren County protests, and 
subsequent studies have provided objective proof of its existence.50 
These studies have found that the burden of living with hazardous 
waste has fallen “more heavily on poor than on well-to-do, more heav-
ily on black and brown than on white.”51
1. The First Investigation 
 Following the protests at Warren County, the GAO conducted a 
study entitled “Siting of Hazardous Waste Landªlls and Their Correla-
tion with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities.”52 
The GAO study examined the racial and economic makeup of the 
communities in which the four hazardous waste landªlls in the south-
eastern United States were sited.53 The study offered proof of an “ir-
refutable nexus between the presence of hazardous waste or industrial 
facilities and minority communities.”54 Census data showed that at 
three of the four sites, the majority of the population was African-
American, and at all four sites the mean income for African-American 
people living near the facilities was lower than the mean income for all 
races combined.55 This study was the ªrst of its kind to examine the ra-
cial and economic situation surrounding hazardous waste facility siting, 
                                                                                                                      
47 According to Bullard, the EJ movement was organized by “[i]ndigenous black insti-
tutions, organizations, leaders, and networks . . . coming together against polluting indus-
tries and discriminatory environmental policies.” Bullard, supra note 7, at 5. 
48 Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical Trade, 
12 Law & Ineq. 267, 303 (1994); see Daniel Kevin, “Environmental Racism” and Locally Unde-
sirable Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 
121, 121–22 (1997). 
49 Bullard, supra note 7, at 98; see Chavis, supra note 18, at 3. 
50 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 98 (“Environmental racism is real; it is not merely an 
invention of wild-eyed sociologists or radical environmental justice activists.”); Evans, supra 
note 16, at 1225; Saleem, supra note 37, at 221 (ªnding that the protest at Warren County 
“infused civil rights organizations into the environmental movement”). 
51 Andrew Szasz, Ecopopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environ-
mental Justice 106 (1994). 
52 See GAO Report, supra note 12; see Bullard, supra note 16, at 91. 
53 See GAO Report, supra note 12, at 1. 
54 Evans, supra note 16, at 1227. 
55 GAO Report, supra note 12, at 4. 
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and raised the question of whether this problem was unique to the 
Southeast or pervasive to the entire United States.56
2. Beyond the GAO Study 
 Following the GAO Study, in 1987 the United Church of Christ’s 
Commission on Racial Justice (“UCCRJ”) conducted a more compre-
hensive study, entitled “Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States,” 
which analyzed community demographics to ascertain the relation-
ship between race and hazardous waste facility siting nationwide.57 
According to Reverend Ben Chavis, Commission Director, the study 
showed that “race has been a factor in the location of commercial 
hazardous waste facilities in the United States”58 This study, widely 
cited by EJ advocates, found that race was the predominant factor cor-
related to these siting decisions, surpassing socioeconomic status.59 
Some of its most conclusive ªndings included that: (1) three out of 
ªve African-American and Latinos live in communities with toxic 
waste facilities; (2) four times as many minorities live in areas with 
toxic waste facilities than live in areas without such sites; and (3) three 
out of ªve of the largest commercial hazardous waste facilities are lo-
cated in predominantly African-American or Hispanic communities.60 
The UCCRJ study alleges that it is “virtually impossible” that this dis-
crepancy in siting occurred by chance, and concludes that the dis-
crepancy was created by underlying factors of distributive and political 
justice inextricably related to race, including inexpensive land located 
in minority communities, lack of local opposition, and immobility of 
residents due to poverty.61
 In 1994, a compilation of studies found that these racial discrep-
ancies continued to exist.62 Of sixty-four studies conducted after the 
UCCRJ study, sixty-three documented various similar environmental 
disparities as a result of race or income that continued to exist.63 Data 
from incongruous study, which found that there was no correlation 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Charles Lee, Beyond Toxic Wastes and Race, in Confronting Environmental Ra-
cism, supra note 18, at 41, 43. 
57 Mahoney, supra note 17, at 368–69; see UCCRJ Study, supra note 12, at 167–68. 
58 UCCRJ Study, supra note 12, at 169. 
59 See Lazarus, supra note 25, at 801–02; Mahoney, supra note 17, at 369. 
60 See UCCRJ Study, supra note 12, at 168–69; Boyle, supra note 43, at 968–69. 
61 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 30, at 163–64. 
62 See Benjamin A. Goldman et al., Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited: An Update of the 1987 
Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites I, 
13–18 (1994), in Manaster, supra note 12, at 174–79. 
63 See id. at 175. 
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between race or economic status and siting decisions, yielded results 
consistent with the other studies when analyzed using the methods of 
the other studies.64 The most extreme data, from a 1993 study, indi-
cated that people of color were 47% more likely than whites to live 
near a commercial hazardous waste facility.65
3. The Government’s Response 
 The Clinton administration was the most recent government or-
ganization to take ofªcial action related to EJ.66 The Administration 
made EJ “‘a centerpiece of its environmental program.’”67 In 1994, fol-
lowing the results of the UCCRJ study and subsequent analysis, the Ad-
ministration promulgated Executive Order 12,898, “Federal Actions to 
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations,”68 which directed federal agencies to identify and 
address the effects of their environmental programs and policies on 
minority and low-income populations.69 President Clinton further en-
forced the Administration’s commitment to EJ in a separate memoran-
dum that directed every federal agency to promote enforcement of 
health and environmental statutes, particularly in minority and low-
income areas, by developing and implementing EJ strategies.70 The 
memorandum directed agencies to conduct all programs substantially 
affecting human health or the environment “in a manner that will not 
exclude populations from participation in, or denying the beneªts of, 
or subjecting persons to discrimination because of race, color or na-
tional origin.”71
                                                                                                                      
64 See id. at 176. The incongruous study was a 1994 study by sociologists at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst, which found that there was no correlation between race or 
economic status and siting decisions. Id. The researchers did not use the entire United 
States as a comparison group but rather focused solely on communities that were home to 
commercial hazardous waste sites. Id. Furthermore, the study classiªed communities based 
on census tracts rather than zip codes, which created a narrower deªnition of community 
for examination purposes. Id. These results were consistent with all of the rest of the stud-
ies once examined through the broader, more inclusive lens. Id. 
65 Id. at 174. 
66 EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ej.html (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
67 Kevin, supra note 48, at 121 (quoting G. Marc Whitehead, Toxic Tort Litigation: Devel-
oping Issues and Their Impact on Case Preparation and Presentation, C921 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 525, 537 
(1994)). 
68 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
69 See Kevin, supra note 48, at 128. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 128–29; see EPA, supra note 66. 
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 Executive Order 12,898 fell short, however, as it did not deªne a 
method or test by which agencies could measure the disproportionate 
effects of their activities.72 Although the Order was designed to bring 
attention to the environmental injustices in low-income and minority 
communities, its lack of guidance for agencies responsible for imple-
menting amelioration programs has resulted in little response from 
parties interested in the EJ movement.73 Numerous proposed pieces 
of legislation, including the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 
1993,74 have attempted to incorporate demographic material into site 
selection criteria, but none have been enacted.75
II. Litigating Environmental Justice Cases 
 Civil rights claims in EJ lawsuits can be forceful and powerful 
tools to educate the public and the government about occurrences of 
environmental injustice and environmental racism in particular.76 
High proªle cases have been brought under Title VI77 and Title VII78 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, almost every EJ case has 
alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.79 This Note focuses on how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Bush v. Gore could give new light to equal protection litiga-
tion for EJ plaintiffs. 
A. The Equal Protection Clause 
 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that neither federal nor 
state government is permitted to “deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”80 The purpose of this clause, 
as recognized by many constitutional scholars, is to secure to every 
American the right to freedom from intentional and arbitrary dis-
                                                                                                                      
72 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
73 See Popescu & Gandy, supra note 28, at 150. 
74 H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993). 
75 See Kevin, supra note 48, at 130–31. 
76 See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 523, 541 (1994). 
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000); see e.g., Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 
2003) (holding that Title VI provides for a private right of action for retaliation). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–17; see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
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ing that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
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crimination by government actors.81 In the context of individual 
rights, the Equal Protection Clause is heralded as “among the most 
important constitutional sources.”82 It originated in response to the 
emancipation of slaves after the Civil War to ensure equality and pro-
tection of the law.83 The philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause is 
that all Americans—whether white or of color, rich or poor—are enti-
tled to equal protection under U.S. law.84
 Through the Equal Protection Clause, citizens may challenge a 
governmental action when that action either draws a distinction 
among people based on characteristics or discriminates as to the exer-
cise of a fundamental right.85 Challenges are brought when individu-
als or groups of individuals perceive that the government has been 
acting in a manner which demonstrates vindictiveness, unjustiªable 
standards, or arbitrary classiªcations.86 A lawsuit alleging that a law is 
racially discriminatory may challenge the law as either facially dis-
criminatory or as having a discriminatory impact or purpose.87 Either 
challenge requires a strict scrutiny analysis by the reviewing court; the 
court will uphold the challenged law only if the government, which 
has the burden of proof, demonstrates that the questioned action is 
necessary to achieve a compelling public purpose.88
 However, to trigger strict scrutiny the plaintiff must ªrst provide 
proof of a discriminatory purpose on the part of the government in 
enacting the law.89 The disproportionate impact of a governmental 
action—without corroborating evidence—has been held insufªcient 
to trigger a strict scrutiny analysis throughout the past thirty years.90 
According to Justice White, writing for the majority in Washington v. 
Davis, the Court has never held “that a law or other ofªcial act, with-
                                                                                                                      
81 See J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of Equal Protection: Willowbrook and the 
New Non-Arbitrariness Standard, 11 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 263, 265 (2001). 
82 Id. at 267. 
83 Lapointe, supra note 4, at 446; see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) 
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “design was to protect an emancipated race, 
and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those who belong to it”). 
84 See Bullard, supra note 7, at 7. 
85 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 648–49 
(2d ed. 2002). 
86 See McGuinness, supra note 81, at 269. 
87 See Chemerinsky, supra note 85, at 644–45. 
88 See id. at 645. 
89 Id. at 682. 
90 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that there must be proof 
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out regard to whether it reºects a racially discriminatory purpose, is 
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate im-
pact.”91 This decision differs in its discrimination analysis from the 
Courts’ decision just ªve years earlier in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that, 
at least for a Title VII claim, a reviewing court must look to results and 
not intent or purpose to determine whether there is evidence of dis-
crimination.92 The Davis Court found the Griggs decision, which ex-
amined a case brought under Title VII, was nonbinding in other racial 
discrimination circumstances.93 The Court rationalized that the dif-
ferent application results from a fear that examining impact alone 
may actually be more burdensome to the poor than to the afºuent, 
thereby having the opposite of the intended effect.94 The Court 
found, therefore, that strict scrutiny is triggered only by the plaintiff’s 
demonstration of intentional or purposeful discrimination.95
 Since Davis, the government need not offer a racially neutral ex-
planation for laws with a discriminatory impact.96 Instead, the burden 
rests on the plaintiff to prove the discriminatory intent of government 
actors.97 Professor Robert Bennett suggests that this heavy burden on 
plaintiffs is justiªed, as he believes the goal of the Equal Protection 
Clause is to stop discriminatory acts, not necessarily to bring about 
equal results.98 However, this question is central to literature regard-
ing the proper application of the Equal Protection Clause, and was 
contradicted by the Court’s recent holding in Bush v. Gore.99 Professor 
                                                                                                                      
91 426 U.S. at 239. 
92 See 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
93 See Lapointe, supra note 4, at 453–54 (examining the application of Davis, as com-
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94 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
 A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, 
absent compelling justiªcation, if in practice it beneªts or burdens one race 
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95 See Kevin, supra note 48, at 146–47. 
96 See Chemerinksy, supra note 85, at 684. 
97 See id. at 682. 
98 See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and De-
mocratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049, 1076–77 (1979). See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
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rate impact of a government action in the context of voting rights). 
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Laurence Tribe argues the other side, advocating that “‘the goal of the 
equal protection clause is not to stamp out impure thoughts, but to 
guarantee a full measure of human dignity for all.’”100 This approach 
to equal protection analysis has been litigated in EJ lawsuits brought 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and is the focus of this Note. 
B. Difªculty in Litigating Equal Protection for Environmental  
Justice Plaintiffs 
 The standard of intent since Davis, where the Court placed the 
burden of proof on plaintiffs to prove intentional or purposeful dis-
crimination by government actors, has been a major roadblock for 
plaintiffs litigating EJ cases under the Equal Protection Clause.101 Plain-
tiffs have less access than government ofªcials to documentation dis-
closing the intent of lawmakers in sanctioning government actions, 
assuming this documentation exists and accurately reºects the reason-
ing behind the decisions.102 Furthermore, siting decisions regarding 
hazardous waste facilities can often be justiªed by facially neutral fac-
tors, and any documentation which plaintiffs could provide might tend 
to reºect these alternate justiªcations.103
 In cases which have challenged the siting of a hazardous waste 
facility under the Equal Protection Clause, disparate distributional 
effects have been insufªcient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.104 
The courts have found that reliance on concrete statistical evidence, 
such as the UCCRJ and GAO studies, does not sufªce to prove the in-
tent of government actors.105 Reviewing courts, therefore, have never 
reached a strict scrutiny analysis; the challenged laws and actions have 
been perceived as constitutional without the government having to 
prove that the resulting discriminatory effect of an action was funda-
mentally necessary to achieve a compelling public purpose.106 For EJ 
litigants, this barrier has been insurmountable thus far, and disparate 
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. at 685 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1516–19 
(3d ed. 1988)). 
101 See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 183; Godsil, supra note 6, at 410. 
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impacts have been allowed to continue from a constitutional stand-
point.107
1. The Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof 
 To prove the discriminatory intent of a governmental actor, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate more than that the government took a given 
action with knowledge that it would have discriminatory conse-
quences.108 While Professor Larry Simon contends that a concrete 
showing of signiªcant disproportionate impact in a particular minority 
group ought to be enough to force the government to explain that the 
action was taken for reasons other than prejudice, this burden, as it 
currently stands, rests on the plaintiff.109 The Supreme Court deline-
ated several ways in which the plaintiff may prove discriminatory pur-
pose in a leading EJ case brought under the Equal Protection Clause, 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.110
 In Arlington Heights, the Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation (“MHDC”) entered into a contract with the Clerics of St. 
Viator to construct racially integrated low- and moderate-income 
housing on the clerics’ land in Arlington Heights, Illinois.111 The con-
tract was contingent upon the MHDC’s ability to secure zoning clear-
ances from the Village, as the development did not conform to local 
zoning laws that allowed only single-family residential housing.112 To 
consider the MHDC’s proposal, the Commission held public meetings 
during which the community spoke both for and against the rezon-
ing.113 Many of the comments focused on the reasons for which the 
area had been zoned single-family, though a signiªcant number also 
addressed concerns about the “social issues” involved in this particular 
proposed project—the desirability or undesirability of introducing 
racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing to a predomi-
                                                                                                                      
107 See Evans, supra note 16, at 1280. 
108 See Pers. Adm’r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that “‘[d]iscriminatory 
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Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1041, 1111 (1978). 
110 See 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
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and Throughout the Nation, 33 U. Balt. L. Rev. 153, 186 (2004). 
112 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255–58. 
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nantly white, afºuent community.114 Despite the admission of race 
being a factor in the decision, the village refused to rezone the clerics’ 
land and denied the proposal.115 In response, the clerics brought a 
claim in district court under the Equal Protection Clause.116
 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held 
that the government’s decision was not motivated by discriminatory 
intent but rather was based on legitimate zoning purposes.117 The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed the district court’s decision, ªnding that the refusal would 
have a disproportionate impact on minorities and failed to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.118 The U.S. Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari to determine the issue of intent.119 In its 
analysis, the Court delineated several different ways in which discrimi-
natory purpose can be proven by plaintiffs in an equal protection ac-
tion, including: (1) the discriminatory effect of the action; (2) the his-
torical background of the decision; (3) the speciªc sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision; (4) the departures from the 
normal procedural sequence; (5) the departures from the normal sub-
stantive standards; and (6) the legislative or administrative history of 
the decision.120 In addition, the Court suggested that statistical proof of 
discrimination toward a particular group may give rise to a ªnding of 
intent.121
 The Court went on to ªnd that once there is proof that a decision 
has been motivated, even in part, by a discriminatory purpose, the 
burden shifts to the government—consistent with strict scrutiny—to 
prove that “the same decision would have resulted even had the im-
permissible purpose not been considered.”122 If a reviewing court is 
convinced that there is a discriminatory purpose, the law is treated as 
racially motivated and thus is invalid under the Equal Protection 
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Clause.123 Disproportionate impact may be weighed as evidence of 
discrimination, but impact alone, under Arlington Heights, is not 
enough to prove intent or trigger strict scrutiny.124 Ultimately, while 
the Court in Arlington Heights acknowledged the existence of refer-
ences to social issues in the history of the decision, it did not ªnd that 
the evidence demonstrated that the refusal to rezone was racially mo-
tivated, and thus concurred with the District Court to deny MHDC’s 
application.125
C. Theory in Practice: The Intent Hurdle for Environmental Justice Litigants 
Challenging Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities 
 Despite the difªculties experienced in proving a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause in Arlington Heights, equal protection remains 
“at the core of environmental justice, pulling together diverse themes 
of fairness in decisionmaking processes and substantive outcomes.”126 
Litigating under the Equal Protection Clause has been—and contin-
ues to be—the primary method of introducing civil rights into the 
realm of EJ where the government is the discriminatory actor.127 How-
ever, since the burden continues to rest on the plaintiff once the gov-
ernment has produced a plausible, nonracially motivated justiªcation 
for its action, this hurdle has been overwhelming thus far.128
 Plaintiffs, however, continue to ªle and argue equal protection 
claims in EJ litigation.129 The decision to ªle rests on the belief that 
the intent standard demonstrates a misconception of the causes of 
racial discrimination, whereby racist decisions are assumed to be overt 
and made on a conscious level which can be detected by a showing of 
the decisionmaker’s state of mind.130 EJ advocates remain hopeful that 
continuing to ªle such lawsuits will ultimately force the Court to real-
ize that subconscious racism is a pervasive problem in modern soci-
ety.131 The need to modernize the intent analysis by holding those 
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who discriminate liable regardless of intent is in line with the ultimate 
goal of the Equal Protection Clause: to improve minority conditions 
and protect all people as equal under the law.132 In hazardous waste 
facility siting decisions, it should not make a difference whether gov-
ernment actors are intending to discriminate. Rather, the focal point 
of the litigation, as it was in Bush, should be remedying the objectively 
measurable discriminatory impact that these decisions have produced. 
 The ªrst major EJ case challenging hazardous waste facility siting 
under the Equal Protection Clause was Bean v. Southwestern Waste Man-
agement Corp.133 In Bean, residents living near a proposed site for a 
solid waste landªll facility argued that the selection of that particular 
site—located in a census tract with minorities comprising 70% of the 
population, rather than another equally viable site where minorities 
comprised only 18.4% of the surrounding population—was part of a 
pattern of racial discrimination by the Texas Department of Health.134 
The plaintiffs’ case rested on population statistics of the sites as they 
existed at the time of the case, which showed that 15% of Houston’s 
solid waste sites were located in areas with over 70% minority popula-
tions.135 However, the reviewing court refused to consider these statis-
tics, opting instead to look at the population statistics of the surround-
ing areas on the day each site opened.136
 Looking at the facts presented in Bean, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had failed to establish the stark pattern of discrimination 
necessary to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof following Arlington 
Heights.137 The decision acknowledged that statistical data concerning 
Houston’s solid waste sites at the time may have shown a pattern of 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but the 
court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to stop the construc-
tion of the landªll.138 The court did, however, acknowledge that, “the 
plaintiffs have established that the decision to grant the permit was 
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both unfortunate and insensitive.”139 The court questioned why the 
city chose to place a solid waste landªll within 1700 feet of a primarily 
minority-attended high school and only a slight distance from a resi-
dential neighborhood.140 This questioning ultimately lead to a victory 
for the EJ movement, as the city subsequently restricted the dumping 
of garbage near public facilities such as schools and prohibited city-
owned trucks from dumping at the landªll.141 Furthermore, the Texas 
Department of Health began requiring demographic data regarding 
proposed landªll sites.142 However, the facility at issue was still built in 
a minority census tract.143
 Another lawsuit in which the Equal Protection Clause provided 
the basis for EJ litigation was East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. 
Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission.144 In that case, com-
munity residents living near a proposed private landªll site alleged 
that the site selection had both a discriminatory impact and, like Bean, 
was demonstrative of the defendant’s pattern of siting waste facilities 
in minority communities.145 The plaintiffs in East Bibb Twiggs con-
tended that the defendant’s decision to site this facility in this particu-
lar neighborhood—which was roughly seventy percent minority resi-
dents—was part of a history of discrimination, as detailed in newspaper 
articles reporting a series of Planning and Zoning Commission deci-
sions.146 In addition, the plaintiffs submitted evidence of the legisla-
tive history of the decision, including statements made by commission 
members regarding the initial denial of another proposed site for rea-
sons including “adjacen[cy] to a residential area” and “increased traf-
ªc and noise.”147 Although siting the facility at East Bibb Twiggs would 
create similar effects in the surrounding neighborhood, the proposal 
was approved.148 The plaintiffs thus contended that there must have 
been an “individious racial purpose . . . [that] motivated the commis-
sion to reconsider its decision and to approve that use which was at 
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ªrst denied.”149 However, the reviewing court failed to ªnd these rea-
sons indicative of intent and held that there had been no deprivation 
of equal protection.150
 Despite the demonstrable historical patterns of discrimination 
and clearly disproportionate effects, courts continue to deny relief un-
der the Equal Protection Clause absent a showing of intentional or 
purposeful discrimination.151 Both Bean and East Bibb Twiggs demon-
strate the reluctancy of courts, following Arlington Heights, to provide 
relief to plaintiffs, even though the site selections in those two cases 
appear facially discriminatory.152 However, recent case developments 
suggest that intentional environmental discrimination is not necessar-
ily an insurmountable hurdle when it comes to the requisite proof of 
intent, giving new hope to litigators that arguing for constitutional 
protection in environmental cases is not a lost cause.153
 In Miller v. City of Dallas, residents of the Cadillac Heights area of 
Dallas brought a claim against the City for intentional racial discrimi-
nation in the provision of municipal services.154 The plaintiffs alleged 
that lawmakers discriminated against residents of Cadillac Heights— 
98.5% of whom are minorities and 46% of whom live in poverty—with 
respect to ºood protection, zoning, industrial nuisances, landªll prac-
tices, streets and drainage, and federal funding for housing and com-
munity development.155 The plaintiffs provided historical and demo-
graphic evidence that strongly supported claims of impermissible 
race-based zoning, similar to the evidence presented in Arlington 
Heights, Bean, and East Bibb Twiggs.156 For example, they presented evi-
dence that the city refused to enforce local and state laws regarding 
the harmful effects of lead pollution from smelters in Cadillac Heights, 
yet used zoning authority to protect white residents from the same 
effects.157 Ultimately, the court denied summary judgment for the de-
fendants, ªnding that the plaintiffs had presented sufªcient facts to 
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show a genuine issue for trial.158 However, the case was never fully liti-
gated as the result of a monetary settlement.159
 A similar result occurred in Calvary Pentecostal Church v. Town of 
Freetown, a dispute involving discriminatory zoning and permitting 
decisions that plaintiffs alleged were the result of historical practices 
of intentional discrimination.160 In Calvary, the plaintiffs were Cape 
Verdean residents of the Braley Road section of Freetown, Massachu-
setts.161 According to the complaint, Freetown, along with many other 
towns in Southeastern Massachusetts, subjected minority residents to 
discrimination through the attempted enforcement of Jim Crow laws.162 
Cape Verdeans make up approximately 0.7% of Freetown residents, 
but virtually all of the Cape Verdean residents live in the Braley Road 
section of the town.163 The complaint refers to discriminatory zoning 
decisions—such as a failure of the town to provide adequate water fa-
cilities to Braley Road, as well as a 1996 decision by the Town Zoning 
Board to zone Braley Road as “industrial,” despite the residential 
character of the neighborhood.164 In 2000, the board approved the 
development of an asphalt plant, a concrete plant, and an 800,000-
square-foot warehouse and distribution center to be built on Braley 
Road.165 Residents protested the projects, and the plans to build the 
warehouse were withdrawn.166 While the board alleged that the devel-
opment of Braley Road was motivated solely by the recent zoning 
changes, members recognized that past boards had not been sensitive 
to the needs of residents.167
 The District Court hearing Calvary referred the issue to alternative 
dispute resolution, thereby indicating that the court felt there were suf-
ªcient facts to hear the case but wished to save its resources if the par-
ties could come to a mutual resolution.168 While they were never fully 
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litigated, both of these cases have been signiªcant in demonstrating 
courts’ willingness to hear constitutional challenges to environmental 
laws when plaintiffs have brought forth afªrmative evidence of dispa-
rate impact, regardless of the government’s intent.169 Though litigating 
an EJ claim under the Equal Protection Clause has thus far proven 
difªcult, there are beneªts to bringing these cases.170 Most notably, these 
lawsuits have brought environmental injustices—such as the disparate 
impact of hazardous waste facility site selection—to national attention.171
D. Despite the Challenges, Bringing Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause 
Continues to Beneªt the Environmental Justice Movement 
 While litigating an EJ claim under the Equal Protection Clause 
has thus far proven difªcult, there are numerous beneªts to bringing 
these cases.172 Each case pushes the courts to recognize the disparate 
impact of environmental decisions, which affect low-income and mi-
nority communities.173 Furthermore, the cause gains support through 
publicity and education of both the judiciary and the public.174 By 
bringing these lawsuits, environmental injustices such as the disparate 
impact of hazardous waste facility site selection and exclusionary zon-
ing practices across the country are brought to the forefront of na-
tional attention and discussion.175
 As Professor Gerald Torres suggests, reasons for distributional 
inequality may be the result of a combination of historical decision-
making and market dynamics beyond racism.176 An emphasis on ra-
cism may shift the focus of the EJ movement away from the achieve-
ment of equality in politics and distribution of negative environmental 
impacts, and instead “seems designed to begin a relatively fruitless 
search for a wrong-doer, or in other words, the bad person with evil 
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intent.”177 The goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to improve and 
guarantee equal treatment for all people, not to punish racists.178 If 
real equality is to result from the EJ movement, framing existing dis-
parities as solely the result of racism or discrimination will not be a 
successful avenue.179 Alleging racism may gain publicity for instances 
of apparent racism, as it did in Warren County.180 However, this type 
of intentional bias and purposeful discrimination need not be explicit 
for environmental injustice to occur.181
 Framing environmental injustice as the result of racism is not the 
most effective means of bringing about equality.182 Jumping to an accu-
sation of racism as a motivating force for environmental policymaking is 
not only difªcult to prove, but can alienate critical decisionmakers who 
may otherwise be sympathetic to the existence of disparate impacts.183 
Furthermore, it may have the opposite effect by creating sympathy for 
those accused of discriminating as “victims” of the so-called unsubstan-
tiated claims.184 Thus, putting aside a claim of racism and instead liti-
gating on the existence of disparate effects, whether intentional or un-
intentional, is likely to be more palpable to a reviewing court.185
 To bring about real change and equality, the government should 
be subject to strict scrutiny as soon as a plaintiff objectively proves dis-
parate impact of a governmental action. In the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision Bush v. Gore, the Court did just that by basing a deci-
sion on the effect and potentially disparate impact of the decision, not 
on the intent of the actors.186 While the speciªc facts of the decision 
differed from the EJ context, the factors which the Court considered 
to determine the constitutionality of the act in question are the 
same.187 This decision gives new hope to EJ advocates and litigants 
that the Court may be willing to see the ºawed burden of proof stan-
dard in its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. 
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III. A Breath of Fresh Air in the Equal Protection Doctrine 
 EJ litigants have been stonewalled in challenging race-based deci-
sions for hazardous waste facility siting under the Equal Protection 
Clause because of the burden of proving intent.188 While this standard 
is daunting in many cases, there are instances in which the racial bias 
of a given decision is evident and proof is readily available; those 
claims, according to one author, “should be pursued without hesita-
tion.”189 In light of the general societal disapproval of racism, however, 
racially discriminatory decisions are not likely to be overtly race-
based.190 As a result, civil rights lawyers have become frustrated and 
have begun to consider these types of claims “certain losers.”191 Never-
theless, there may still be hope for these types of claims given recent 
developments in the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.192
 On December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in 
Bush v. Gore, which disregarded the proof of intent requirement de-
lineated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.193 
Instead, the opinion, written by Justice Scalia, makes a decision under 
equal protection by considering the rudimentary requirements of uni-
form rules and nonarbitrary treatment, and never addresses the plain-
tiff’s burden of demonstrating intent.194 While the mainstay of Equal 
Protection Clause claims in voting rights cases—like the racial dis-
crimination cases from which the fundamental right to vote emanat-
ed195—has been the establishment of an intentional violation of equal 
protection by a state actor, neither the counties nor any voter ever 
even alleged such discrimination in Bush.196 Despite a lack of proof—
or even so much as an allegation—of governmental intent to dis-
criminate, the Court found a violation of the Equal Protection 
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Clause.197 In doing so, however, the Court reverted to a prior interpre-
tation of what triggers strict scrutiny in a racial discrimination case: 
the disparate impact and effects test of the early 1970s, articulated in 
the Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.198
 The decision in Bush has the potential for monumental impact in 
the realm of EJ litigation, as the effects and disparate impacts of haz-
ardous waste facility siting decisions have been repeatedly proven with 
statistical data.199 Proving that these effects were “nonarbitrary” may 
provide a new hurdle in EJ litigation, as it remains unclear what stan-
dards are constitutionally required to prove arbitrariness.200 However, 
this Note focuses on how the relaxed burden of proving intent in Bush 
has the potential to make the hurdle less daunting to EJ advocates. 
A. Easily Triggered Strict Scrutiny: A Reconsideration of the Equal  
Protection Requirements 
 In Bush, the Supreme Court effectively decided the 2000 United 
States presidential election between George W. Bush, Governor of 
Texas and then-Vice President Al Gore.201 On November 7, 2000, Vice 
President Gore won the popular vote in the presidential election, but 
the outcome of the Electoral College remained uncertain, dependent 
entirely on election results from the State of Florida.202 Governor 
Bush was declared an early winner in Florida, but Vice President Gore 
subsequently requested a recount in the counties of Volusia, Palm 
Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade.203 The recount was permissible un-
der Florida state law, allowing either candidate to request a recount 
should an election appear to be decided by less than one-half of one 
percent of votes counted.204
 After numerous lawsuits regarding the proper application of Flor-
ida laws in recount procedures, Vice President Gore ªled a complaint 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Leon County, contesting 
the certiªcation of results in the Florida election and arguing that the 
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manual recount ought to continue until all votes were counted.205 His 
arguments rested on the principles clearly delineated in McPherson v. 
Blacker,206 in which the Court held that once the state legislature vests 
the right to vote for presidential electors in the people, it becomes a 
fundamental right whereby equal weight must be accorded to each 
vote.207 Vice President Gore went on to argue that by discontinuing 
the manual recount, whereby each vote was counted and the intent of 
each voter discerned, the state was, through arbitrary and disparate 
treatment, valuing one person’s vote over that of another.208 While he 
asserted that votes were being treated differently in different counties 
as a result of nonuniform procedures, the complaint did not ever al-
lege that these arbitrary procedures were the result of intentional dis-
crimination by government actors—the traditional burden of intent 
requirement after Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights.209
 The trial court decided against Vice President Gore, who subse-
quently appealed.210 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ordered 
that the manual recounts continue.211 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and oral arguments were heard on Monday, De-
cember 11, 2000.212 The Court issued a majority opinion stopping the 
manual recount less than twenty-four hours later.213 In its opinion, the 
Court addressed equal protection and the importance of respecting 
the intent of every voter.214 The Court did not decide whether there 
could be variation among counties and districts regarding the recount 
procedures; rather, it decided whether the implementation and effect 
of those procedures had sufªcient constitutional safeguards.215
 The Florida Supreme Court ordered that the intent of each voter 
be discerned.216 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ªnding that the 
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rules—or lack thereof—being used to ensure that the intent of each 
voter was properly discerned across all counties were insufªcient to 
ensure voter rights under the Equal Protection Clause.217 The Court 
found that since the process for determining intent was unclear, the 
decisions being made were arbitrary and thus the process itself was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, permitting unequal treat-
ment of voters.218 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared: 
[W]e are presented with a situation where a state court with 
the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide re-
count with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court or-
ders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance 
that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and 
fundamental fairness are satisªed.219
Without considering the intent of the Florida government when it 
created these procedures, the Court found that the procedure in 
place was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, “inconsistent with 
the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right 
of each voter,” ªnding that the lack of procedural safeguards in itself 
was enough to trigger strict scrutiny.220
 The Court clearly limited the decision to the facts of Bush, but it 
is unclear whether the interpretation of the requirements of equal 
protection may be viable as precedent in cases outside the voting rights 
context.221 Voting rights questions arising under the Equal Protection 
Clause are traditionally analyzed using strict scrutiny as voting has 
been deemed a fundamental right: the same analysis generally used by 
the courts in reviewing allegations of racial discrimination.222 In order 
to get to the strict scrutiny test in the EJ context, Arlington Heights 
made it clear that the plaintiff must ªrst clear the intent hurdle.223 In 
Bush, however, it appears that the Court did not consider the govern-
ment’s intent; instead, it immediately applied strict scrutiny, shifting 
the burden to the government to prove that the standards being used 
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to conduct the vote recount were uniform and nonarbitrary, based 
solely on the potentially disparate impact of the recount procedures.224
 Bush is contextually distinct from the hazardous waste facility sit-
ing decisions challenged under the Equal Protection Clause by EJ ad-
vocates, but its holding has the potential to change the face of EJ liti-
gation by lessening plaintiffs’ heavy burden to prove discriminatory 
intent of government actors.225 The Court, in reviewing Bush, plainly 
asserted that its decision was limited to the facts of the case.226 How-
ever, “[a] desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal 
protection guarantees.”227 Time pressure cannot be used as a justiªca-
tion for ignoring or misapplying the fundamental guarantees and 
safeguards of the Equal Protection Clause.228 In making the statement 
“[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances,” the Court 
attempted to foreclose the possibility of using the decision as prece-
dent outside the facts of the particular case before it.229 It is the duty 
of the Court, though, to interpret the Constitution and apply it uni-
formly to cases or controversies arising out of questions of law.230 The 
Court is bound by the decisions it makes, and “cannot simply depart 
from precedent and simultaneously erase that departure as if it never 
happened.”231
 Opinions issued by the Court cannot be declared “constitutional” 
and simultaneously have no precedential value, especially when a de-
cision departs from precedent.232 If that were the case, the Court 
would lose all credibility.233 Thus, the Bush analysis cannot be consid-
ered entirely inapplicable outside of the voting rights context.234 Even 
if the decision stands only for the holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause demands assurances of equal treatment and fundamental fair-
ness, or that people—or, in this case, votes—in similar circumstances 
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must be treated similarly, its holding must apply uniformly to all cases 
unless and until it is overturned at some future date.235
B. Similarities Between Voting Rights Cases and Environmental Justice Cases 
 During oral arguments in Bush, but prior to the decision, numer-
ous commentaries dissected the potential implications of the decision 
in light of the Equal Protection Clause.236 The authors of one com-
mentary urged that: 
if [the decision in the case] comes down for the justices to the 
14th Amendment and the promise of equal protection, one 
can only hope for the sake of the country that they consider 
how not counting all the votes mirrors too closely the habits 
of heart and mind that brought us slavery and segregation— 
the original sins of our nation that the equal protection clause 
sought to repair.237
Voting rights evolved from the very guarantees of equal protection, 
which EJ advocates argue are ignored in hazardous waste facility siting 
decisions with disparate impacts on minority communities.238
 During the height of the Civil Rights movement, the Court in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot made clear that any voting rights statute that had 
the impermissible effect of “despoil[ing]” African-American citizens of 
their right to vote was constitutionally impermissible.239 In Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Court found that, consistent with the “one person, one vote” 
principle established in McPherson, “the right of suffrage can be de-
nied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just 
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the fran-
chise.”240 Subsequently, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court 
found that a poll tax, though neutral on its face, had the impermissi-
ble effect of discrimination based on wealth, and the brunt of this dis-
crimination was borne by African-American citizens.241
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 These cases demonstrate that the Court has been unwilling to 
uphold laws or decisions by government actors that have a disparate 
impact on racial lines in the voting rights context.242 The decision in 
Bush, however, did not bring a voting rights question into play.243 The 
plaintiff did not challenge an attempt by government to prohibit or 
restrict any citizen’s right to vote.244 Instead, the Court’s decision ex-
tended equal protection to the casting and counting of votes, and 
“opened the door to challenging our highly inequitable system of vot-
ing. Claims of unequal treatment by voters in poorer districts are not 
likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from the current majority.”245 
The decision also opened the door to challenges outside of the voting 
rights context, giving new ammunition to plaintiffs who feel that they 
have been wrongfully victimized on racial lines by governmental ac-
tors.246 The Court’s willingness to shift the burden to decisionmakers 
to justify the disparate impact of their decisions, if applied in the EJ 
framework, would signiªcantly lessen the daunting proof of intent 
hurdle for EJ litigants. 
C. Is the EJ Movement Just One Step Behind? Triggering Strict Scrutiny in 
Employment Discrimination Claims 
 As early as 1974, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in a post-Davis 
but pre-Arlington Heights decision, recognized the need for the courts to 
remedy racially disproportionate impacts without proof of discrimina-
tory intent as a major hurdle for plaintiffs.247 In Boston Chapter, 
N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher, an employment discrimination case involving 
a Massachusetts Division of Civil Service requirement that ªreªghters 
pass a written multiple-choice test before entering the ªreªghting acad-
emy, the court found that parties challenging an employment test for 
civil servants: 
[M]ust establish its disproportionate impact by demonstrating 
that, for whatever reason, it is more of a hurdle for minority 
members than for others; once this is shown, the test’s propo-
nents acquire a burden of justiªcation and must “prove that 
the disproportionate impact was simply the result of a proper 
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test demonstrating lesser ability of black and Hispanic candi-
dates to perform the job satisfactorily.”248
The court found that objective data of disparate impact was sufªcient 
to shift the burden to the government to substantiate the action in 
question.249 The ªnding required for burden shifting was even stricter 
than the burden shifting found sufªcient twenty-ªve years later in 
Bush—requiring only the potential for discriminatory impact to shift 
the burden of proof and trigger strict scrutiny analysis.250
 The court in Beecher found that census ªgures demonstrating the 
disproportionately few minority members of a ªre department—as 
compared to minority representation in the community which the de-
partment serves—were weak when used to show the discriminatory 
impact of the hiring exam in question.251 However, the ªgures were 
enough to justify a burden shifting to the government actors to justify 
the use of the exam.252 While the court in Beecher was deciding the 
burden of proving intent before the Arlington Heights standards set by 
the Supreme Court, this minimal showing of discriminatory impact 
was sufªcient to require governmental justiªcation, and the result was 
never overturned.253 However, the data set forth was signiªcantly less 
concrete and objective than the statistics set forth in the GAO and 
UCCRJ studies.254 While courts have been consistently unwilling to 
recognize objective data in EJ litigation as sufªcient to overcome the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof, relaxing the Arlington Heights standards 
would allow the use if such data to overcome this burden.255 In Bush, 
the Court applied this relaxed standard.256 A decree from the Su-
preme Court, such as that in Bush, that even the potential for dispro-
portionate impact violates the Equal Protection Clause, may be 
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sufªcient precedent to lessen the intent hurdle for EJ litigants and 
trigger strict scrutiny.257
D. The Potential Signiªcance of Bush for Environmental Justice Litigants 
 The Supreme Court, in reviewing Arlington Heights, was confronted 
by a government zoning decision whose legislative history showed 
clear references to “social issues” as being motivating factors.258 How-
ever, rather than using that to trigger strict scrutiny and shift the bur-
den of proof to government to justify the disparate impact of their 
decision, they found that this proof was insufªcient for the plaintiff to 
show that the government action was intentionally discriminatory.259 
In both Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. and East Bibb Twiggs 
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission, 
reviewing courts found again that evidence of clear patterns of dis-
crimination by government actors was insufªcient to meet the plain-
tiffs’ burden of intent.260 If, after Bush, disparate impact—as evi-
denced by objective data supplied to the Court—is sufªcient to trigger 
strict scrutiny and shift the burden to the government to justify its own 
actions, legislative history clearly referencing “social issues” as a factor 
in the decisionmaking would be difªcult for the government to cir-
cumvent. 
 The Court should hold to its words under stare decisis, and there 
the showing of proof—or even the possibility—of discriminatory im-
pact should trigger strict scrutiny.261 This would then place the bur-
den on government to justify its own actions, and the potential for a 
different outcome for EJ litigants would be immense.262 Requiring 
that the government implement standards to provide “assurance that 
the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental 
fairness are satisªed,” would mean that additional safeguards would 
be available to EJ advocates.263 In Bush, the potential for disparate im-
pacts of varying vote counting procedures was found to be a violation 
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of the Equal Protection Clause.264 The statistical evidence, from stud-
ies such as the UCCRJ Study and the GAO Report highlight disparate 
impacts that are more than merely potential.265 In both Miller v. City of 
Dallas and Calvary Pentecostal Church v. Town of Freetown, reviewing courts 
gave credibility to this type of statistical data in their site-speciªc analy-
ses, but refused to allow it to sufªce as strong enough to fulªll the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving government intent.266 The refusal of re-
viewing courts to grant summary judgment in favor of the government 
in both cases demonstrates a recent willingness to recognize the dis-
parate impacts presented by EJ plaintiffs.267 The redeªnition of the 
requirements for triggering strict scrutiny under Bush may be just 
what litigants need to legitimize remedying the disproportionate siting 
of hazardous waste facilities in minority neighborhoods.268
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore to apply an equal 
protection-based strict scrutiny analysis to a governmental action 
based upon the potential for racially discriminatory impact provides 
new hope for EJ advocates. Cases brought under the Equal Protection 
Clause for discriminatory siting of hazardous waste facilities, as proven 
by objective data from numerous studies, have been unsuccessful be-
cause of the heavy burden of proof after Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. that plaintiffs establish by afªrmative, 
positive evidence—more than objective studies—of government’s in-
tent to discriminate in decisionmaking. 
 The decision in Bush reverts back to a standard previously an-
nounced by the Court in Griggs Griggs v. Duke Power Co. which consid-
ered disparate impact as sufªcient to overcome the burden of proof. 
While the Bush decision was made under immense time pressure, and 
was self-declared to have no precedential value, it is in line with a gen-
eral tendency of reviewing courts to depart from the strict standard in 
Arlington Heights. Thus, while the decision may claim to have no pre-
cedential value, it provides new insight for EJ advocates seeking to 
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remedy the disproportionate burden of hazardous waste facilities in 
low-income and minority communities and should be a starting point 
in future Equal Protection Clause litigation. 
